Comparative/World 1329 trality of the United States to the fate of postwar and then post-treaty Japan. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations in Washington spoke repeatedly of ensuring that Japan remained on the American side in the Cold War in northeast Asia. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur reported regularly from the embassy in Tokyo that the need for the still weak Japan of the 1950s to trade with the United States would tie the two nations together. Given that Japan had lost its prewar China market and that other nations, led by Britain, were decidedly wary of attempts to encourage any major revival of the Japanese economy and worked to exclude Tokyo from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it was readily apparent that such economic realities ought to have carried the day.
The work is based largely on official publications of the U.S. government, including the "Foreign Relations of the United States" series. In addition, Jeffery conducted interviews in Greece in the late 1980s and utilized manuscript collections found in the Truman Library. But there are no sources in Greek, certainly a drawback when it comes to discussing and analyzing the crucial events that transpired in Greece.
A main argument of the book is that the Truman Doctrine committed the United States unambiguously to help Greece with economic and military aid in order to bring the civil war that was tearing the country apart to a "speedy end" and to rehabilitate the country economically. But, in the author's view, the United States contradicted its own policy of unwavering commitment to aid Greece by placing conditions, such as the demand for political reform, on the Greek government in return for the proffered aid. This critique is repeated in several of the chapters. This argument is not tenable, however, because the United States implemented its bold new policy of containment in as specific a manner as might be reasonably expected. In Greece, the purpose of the aid was to help the Greek government defeat the insurgents. The amount of aid to be given was up to the United States government, which reserved the right to terminate that commitment whenever it saw fit. There was no contradiction in the American policy. The United States sought to include political reform in order to encourage the Greek state to become more efficient and therefore better able to deal with the communist threat.
When it comes to the leftist insurgency, Jeffery argues that the outcome of the civil war was not so much a victory for U.S. policy but rather a defeat for the guerillas in the Democratic Army. Thus the Truman Doctrine was not a resounding success, as touted by the administration in Washington, but a failure. It is true that the communists were not defeated merely because of American involvement. Other factors, including the leadership and tactics of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), the withdrawal of Yugoslav support for the left, the efforts of the Greek government, and public attitudes, played a role. Nevertheless, the termination of the civil war was a victory for the United States, vindicating its policy in Greece while marking a defeat for the communists who in the end failed to achieve their goals.
Finally, the author asserts that U.S. policy failed in its intent to help rehabilitate Greece economically because aid was cut back beginning in 1950, just as the war-ravaged country was starting to get back on its feet after a decade of conflict. Direct economic aid was reduced because the primary goal of the Truman Doctrine was achieved. Greece's inclusion in the Marshall Plan, however, brought continued economic assistance. That more might have been done was noted at the time. But this does not mean that the promises expressed in U.S. policy were inappropriate to the actual efforts. In sum, our knowledge and understanding of the subject is not greatly advanced by this work. Within this context, then, Subritzky's book attempts,
